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IMPERMISSIBLE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION V.
ALLOWABLE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
The United States Supreme Court has long struggled with
cases pertaining to racial discrimination. In 1857, the Court declared that blacks were not citizens of the United States and
Congress was without the power to grant them citizenship.' Following the Civil War and continuing until 1954, the Supreme
Court maintained a policy of "separate but equal" when deciding racial discrimination cases.2 Later, in Brown v. Board of Education,3 the Court declared that segregated school systems
violated the equal protection rights of minorities.
Even today, racial discrimination cases continue to proliferate. Recently, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 4 the Supreme Court held that race may not be the sole
criteria employed when awarding benefits to minorities to redress prior discrimination. The following year, however, in
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,5 the Court concluded
that industries may take into account a person's race. This was
allowed when a remedial program was designed to rectify a violation of a law prohibiting race-based discrimination. It is apparent that the line between impermissible reverse
discrimination 6 and allowable affirmative action 7 is a fine one indeed.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick 8 the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of whether a remedial program for minorities
was constitutional. The Court upheld a statutory provision
which allocated federal funds for local public works solely for
use by minority businesses. However, Fullilove is distinguisha1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See text accompanying notes 53-71 infra.
5. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See text accompanying notes 73-85 infra.

6. "Prejudice or bias exercised against a person or class for purpose of
correcting a pattern of discrimination against another person or class."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1186 (5th ed. 1979).

7. "Employment programs required by federal statutes and regulations designed to remedy discriminatory practices in hiring minority group
members ....

"

BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 55 (5th ed. 1979).

8. 100 S.Ct. 2758 (1980).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:491

ble from previous civil rights cases because "such a judicial decree, following litigation in which a violation of law has been
determined, is wholly different from generalized legislation that
awards benefits and imposes detriments dependent upon the
race of the recipients." 9
The effect of race-based legislation upon the United States
is profound and raises the question of Congress's power to enact
legislation to aid minorities.' 0 Furthermore, it presents
problems of defining minorities and the difficulties attendant
upon the revitalization of racial classifications. Moreover, the
future of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of cases relating
to constitutional questions of equal protection is at stake. This
comment addresses the above enumerated difficulties and discusses Fullilove as a logical, or illogical, extension of previous
2
civil rights legislation" and cases.'
THE FULLILOVE DECISION

The Fullilove case arose when Congress set aside ten percent of all federal funds earmarked for local public works
projects for use by minority business enterprises (MBE). The
initial program was designed to alleviate unemployment in the
construction industry. Several non-MBE's argued that race
should not be the sole factor used to decide who should share in
the set-aside. These non-MBE contactors brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the provision. 13 They alleged the setaside violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and the equal protection section of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.' 4 To resolve these issues the
9. Id. at 2799 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
10. This is often accomplished under the powers granted to Congress by
the Commerce and Spending clauses of the United States Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-4 (1965) (Voting Rights Act of 1965); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000h-6 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964).
12. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(upheld an affirmative action craft-training program); Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (rejected an affirmative action minority
admissions program); United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)
(upheld an affirmative action redistricting program); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (upheld an award of seniority rights to minorities); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upheld voting rights

legislation).
13. See Montana Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 460 F.
Supp. 1174 (D. Mont. 1978); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of
Commerce, 459 F. Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Department of Gen. Servs. v.
Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 273, 147 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1978); cf. Wright
Farms Constr. Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Va. 1977) (MBE provision
violates petitioner's equal protection rights).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Fullilove v. Klutznick .1
The essence of the Fullilove suit was that favored treatment, such as an affirmative action program, was allowed only to
redress proven cases of prior discrimination. 16 Previous programs designed to aid minorities stemmed directly from violations of the fourteenth amendment 17 or the civil rights
statutes. 18 The non-MBE's contended, however, that Congress
never made specific findings of discrimination against MBE's in
the construction industry. 19
Petitioners relied upon the school desegregation cases as
authority to show that prior cases were designed to remedy spe20
cific cases of discrimination rather than alleged discrimination.
First, they argued the scope of the remedies approved by the
Court in the past was designed to fit the extent of the violations. 2 1 Second, they contended that when Congress enacted
legislation to aid minorities, the Court required that it be limited
to redressing prior discrimination. 22 Race-based measures were
sanctioned only after the government had specifically identified
past discrimination. 2 3 Moreover, petitioners distinguished the
minority business set-aside from other affirmative action programs. Previously, they maintained, the courts instituted programs to redress prior discrimination. 24 Here, Congress acted
on its own and directly mandated a program to aid MBE's.
15. 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
16. Id. at 2763.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d(e) (1976).
19. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2775 (1980).
20. E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (displacement of local school board by federal court in school discrimination case
must be based on specific violations); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974) (absent finding that school boundaries are established to foster racial secregation, it is improper to impose a remedy for racial imbalance); see
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); see also Austin
Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (annual reorganization of school attendance zones to prevent
segregated schools exceeds court's authority to enforce desegregation).
21. See United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
22. Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Cmi. L. REv. 775, 797 (1979).
23. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18-25, rehearing denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971) (racially-based teacher and student assignments upheld in order to balance school districts).
24. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, rehearing denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971) (Supreme Court approved school busing).
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The Court rejected the position that the minority business
set-aside represented a departure from previous discrimination
cases. The Court maintained that when a remedy was designed
to cure the effects of alleged prior discrimination, it was permis25
sible to require innocent third parties to share the burden.
proven before an affirmative
Therefore, fault no longer had to be
26
action program would be upheld.
The Court reached this decision by relying upon the commerce and spending clauses of the Constitution. The commerce
clause provides Congress with the power "[tjo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes. '27 Broadly interpreted, this clause
grants Congress the power to promote the economic welfare of
United States citizens. 2 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
shows great deference to Congress when the legislature enacts
29
Conseprograms pursuant to its constitutional powers.
quently, the judiciary rarely restricts the exercise of the commerce power3 ° and upholds the economic decisions of Congress
providing there is some argument, no matter how remote, that
the institutions Congress regulates fall within the commerce
power. 3 ' Thus, the Court allows Congress, under the broad commerce power, to enact legislation to advance social purposes unrelated to traditional economic concerns, namely, relief from
unemployment or inflation.
25. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2778 (1980).
26. "Under the fault idea, the task of antidiscrimination law is to separate from the masses of society those blameworthy individuals who are violating the otherwise shared norm."

Freeman, Legitimizing Racial

Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1054 (1978).
27. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
28. E.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 45-52 (1974)
(Congressional requirement that banks keep records of depositors held

constitutional); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (San Francisco school

system required to institute special language programs to accommodate
Chinese-speaking students); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (Congress has the power to fix the terms

upon which money to states is allocated).
29. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 603
(1949).
30. "[Like all others vested in Congress, [the commerce power] is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges

no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v.
Ogden, 21 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 196 (1824) (emphasis added).
31. For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.

241 (1964), the Court upheld the congressional right to force desegregation
of motels which entertain interstate travelers. The Court asked if a rational
basis existed to determine whether discrimination by motels affected interstate commerce. Since that basis existed, the Court merely looked to see if

the means employed to eliminate the discrimination were both proper and
reasonable. Id. at 258-59.
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In addition to this broad grant of power under the commerce
clause, Congress has broad powers under the spending clause.
Congress is authorized "to pay the Debts and provide for the
'32
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.
Therefore, Congress may appropriate money to further
whatever objectives it chooses 33 with only two restrictions: it
must not violate the Bill of Rights, 34 and the expenditure must
35
be for the general welfare.
In the employment sector, Congress frequently invokes the
spending power or the commerce clause 36 to further economic
and social objectives. Congress implements this power by "conditioning receipt of federal monies upon compliance . . . with
federal statutory and administrative directives. '37 While the
Supreme Court upholds the use of this technique, 38 the question
arises as to how far Congress's power extends to promote the
general welfare.
Recently, Congress exercised this power to promote the
general welfare to remedy widespread unemployment in the
construction industry.39 Originally, under the Local Public
Works Act,4° two billion dollars were appropriated for state and
local governments to use in local public works projects. The
grants were administered by the Secretary of Commerce
through the Commerce Department's Economic Development
Administration. 41 The money was designated for state and local
governments with high unemployment areas. They, in turn, distributed the money to successful bidders to erect needed public
facilities. 42
32. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
33. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (Congress may
elect to remedy economic disparity due to gender discrimination); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Congress may enact legislation
which does not aid all businesses); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113,
127 (1940) (Congress may establish conditions in government contracts);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (Congressional relief from unemployment benefits the general welfare).

34. "Congress may employ racial or ethnic classifications in exercising
its Spending . . . Powers only if those classifications do not violate the
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2776 (1980).

35. Congress is forbidden to spend money on just a privileged few. See
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950).
36. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
37. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2772 (1980).
38. E.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); see note

28 supra.

39. Public Works Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-36 (1977).
40. Local Public Works Capitol Development and Investment Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6701-35 (1976) (Act designed to alleviate high unemployment in

the construction industry by providing federal funds for local public works).
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6702 (1976).
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Within less than one year it became evident that the initial
appropriation was inadequate. There were 25,000 applications
for funds totaling twenty-five billion dollars, but only 2,000 applicants received grants. 43 Consequently, Congress supplemented
the Local Public Works Act program in 1977 with the Public
Works Employment Act4 which provided an additional four billion dollars. The new Act included a provision which prohibited
issuing a grant for any local public works project unless the applicant assured that "at least ten per centum of the amount of
each grant [would] be expended for minority business enterprises. ' 45 The designated minorities were Negroes, Spanishspeaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. 46 Thus, certain minorities were given preferential treatment as a result of
this statutory provision. Past experience had shown that these
minorities simply did not benefit from the previous public works
program as originally formulated. 47 Under this ten percent setaside, minority applicants could compete for 100 percent of federal public works funds whereas nonminority applicants could
compete for only ninety percent of the funds.

A HISTORICAL INQUIRY
Inasmuch as the provision is designed to remedy the effect
of prior discrimination, it is helpful to examine it in light of previous antidiscrimination programs. Some of these programs
were enacted pursuant to legislation such as the Civil Rights Act
of 196448 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 49 Others, such as
43. 123 CONG. REC. 2136 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-36 (1977) (follow-up program to the Local Public

Works Capitol Development and Investment Act designed to provide an additional four billion dollars for local public works).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2) (1977) provides:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no grant
9hall be made under this chapter for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at
least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for
minority business enterprises. For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "minority business enterprise" means a business at least 50 per
centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in the case of
a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which
is owned by minority group members. For the purpose of the preceding
sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States
who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts.
46. Id.
47. 123 CONG. REc. 5098 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell, the sponsor of
the MBE provision).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
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admission programs to universities 50 or training programs, 5 1
were privately formulated.
The Bakke Approach to Preferential Classification
The leading case dealing with the constitutionality of preferential treatment of minorities is Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.52 In Bakke, a white male applied twice for
admission to the Medical School of the University of California
at Davis. He was denied entrance each time. 53 He claimed his
rejections were the result of the school's policy to set aside sixteen seats for disadvantaged students including blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. The University maintained
that the special admissions program was necessary in order to
increase the number of minority students in the medical
school. 54 Bakke, however, was better qualified than any of the
55
minority students accepted.
In a suit seeking admission to the University, Bakke claimed
the special admissions policy violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment 56 and Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.57 The Supreme Court, in a widely divided
decision, held in Bakke's favor and rejected the special admissions policy of the Davis Medical School. The Court maintained
that while race could be considered as one factor in determining
admission policies, it must not be the sole factor.58 In deciding
Bakke, the Court employed two different tests to decide the constitutionality of the Davis set-aside program.
The majority employed the strict scrutiny test. This twopronged examination is often used when a "suspect classification" is invoked similar to the group enumerated in the Davis
set-aside.5 9 A classification is suspect if it is likely to be based
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 276-77.

54. Id. at 272.
55. Id. at 277.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).

58. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
59. The Court uses this standard even when "reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental constitutional rights ... ." San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973); see
also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("[a] government practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights'. . . is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified
only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if
no less restrictive alternative is available."). However, Justice Brennan did
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upon impermissible purposes such as denial of equal educational opportunities. 6 0 The test requires that when a law or program treats persons in similar circumstances differently, the
state must show that (1) the classification serves a compelling
governmental purpose, 61 and (2) the classification is the least
62
restrictive means available to accomplish the stated goal.

Therefore, even if Congress can show that its legislation was
designed to accomplish a public necessity, it must be struck
down if other, less onerous means can be utilized. The strict
judicial protection from arbitrary rascrutiny test thus provides
63
cial classifications.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan recommended a
different test. He maintained that an intermediate test should
be utilized when racial classifications were designed, not to arbitrarily burden a race, but to remedy prior discrimination." Although unadopted, Justice Brennan's test subjects programs
that employ racial classifications to an intermediate standard of
review. 65 First, a court determines whether the stated goal of a
program is sufficiently important to justify the use of a racial
whether the
classification. Thereafter, the court determines
66
classification relates to the articulated goal.

The Bakke majority rejected the intermediate test and applied the strict scrutiny test. The Court found that the Davis
minority set-aside program neither fulfilled a compelling state
interest nor met the least restrictive means available requirement. Bakke, however, did not settle the question of how far the
Court would allow the Constitution to be stretched to permit racial preferences. "On the one hand, justice requires that groups
that have previously suffered gross discrimination be given truly
equal opportunity in American life; on the other, justice prenot employ the strict scrutiny test in Bakke because he found neither a
suspect class nor a violation of a fundamental right.
60. See note 23 supra.
61. For example, the maintenance of national security. Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
62. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
63. This does not mean all restrictions which interfere with civil rights
are unconstitutional. It merely infers that the restrictions are "suspect"
and must be subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts. While a public emergency may justify a denial of civil rights, "racial antagonism never can."
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
64. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 359.
66. Nowak, Realigningthe Standardsof Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral and Permissive Classtifcations, 62
GEo. L.J. 1071 (1974).
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cludes the assignment of benefits and burdens on the arbitrary
basis of racial and ethnic characteristics. '67 Bakke decided only
that voluntary affirmative action programs which employed quotas based solely on race were unconstitutional. 68 Thus, the
Court will uphold an affirmative action program, providing the
measures used to redress prior racial discrimination are limited
to guaranteeing minorities the same access to programs as nonminorities.69 However, once minority groups are given benefits
at the expense of nonminorities who hold superior claims to enjoy the benefits, 70 the program will be declared unconstitu71
tional.
The Weber Approach to Preferential Treatment
Since Bakke related solely to school admissions programs,
the decision does not directly address the issue of racial classifications utilized in the employment sector. This situation was
addressed in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 72 The
Weber case arose when the United Steelworkers of America
Union and Kaiser Aluminum entered into an agreement to eliminate racial imbalance in Kaiser's craftwork force. 73 An on-thejob program was established to train unskilled production workers to become craftsmen. 74 Fifty percent of these positions were
set aside for black employees while the remainder were filled on
the basis of seniority. 75 The special program was designed to
end when the percentage of black skilled craftsmen in the Kaiof blacks in the labor
ser plant approximated the percentage
76
force where the plant was located.
Brian Weber, a white production worker, brought suit when
he was refused a position in the training program. He had seniority over the chosen black trainees 77 and seniority was the
usual basis for advancement in the Kaiser plant. Weber's complaint charged that by selecting black employees with less experience than white employees, Kaiser discriminated against
67. Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination,67
CALIF. L. REv. 87, 87 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Greenawalt].
68. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978).
69. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Higher grades or greater experience are examples.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

(Vol. 14:491

Weber and other similarly situated white employees. He argued
this violated sections 703(a) 78 and 703(d) 7 9 of Title VII.80
The Supreme Court rejected Weber's argument. It held that
nothing in Title VII forbade private employers and unions from
voluntarily agreeing to promote racial preferences when a particular race was underrepresented. 81 The Court held this way
despite its failure to find Kaiser guilty of prior discrimination
against blacks. 82 The Supreme Court sustained the affirmative
action program in Weber on the grounds that:
[tihe plan [did] not unnecessarily trammel the interests of the
white employees. The plan [did] not require the discharge of white
workers and their replacement with new black hirees. Nor [did]
the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white em[would] be white.8 3

ployees; half of those trained in the program

Therefore, although minorities were benefitted by the program, nonminorities were not excluded from it. 84 Furthermore,
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(a) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(d) (1976) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in,
any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976).

81. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)
("The natural inference is that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary
race-conscious affirmative actions.").
82. "In Weber we see ...

that not every step taken is a step forward.

With Weber the Court approved, for the first time ever, preferential classifi-

cations on the basis of race in the absence of any proven constitutional or
statutory violations." T. EASTLAND & W.J. BENNETr, COUNTING By RACE:
EQUALITY FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS To BAKKE AND WEBER 209 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as COUNTING.BY RACE].
83. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)
[citations omitted].
84. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (further defines
the usefulness of Title VII). Here, black employees were granted retroactive seniority rights. However, this case is noteworthy because, for the first
time, innocent third parties (non-discriminating white employees) were required to shoulder part of the burden of the program. The Court stated that
"denial of seniority relief to identifiable victims of racial discrimination on
the sole ground that such relief diminishes the expectations of other, arguably innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate the central
'make whole' objective of Title VU." Id. at 774 (emphasis added). It is nota-
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the program met the two prongs of the strict scrutiny test.85
First, it served the compelling governmental interest of overcoming underrepresentation of blacks in Kaiser's crafts department. Second, it was the least restrictive program available to
accomplish the stated goal.
TRADITIONAL TESTS APPLIED TO THE MINORITY BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE PROGRAM

Based on the Bakke and Weber decisions, there is no compelling governmental interest to sustain an affirmative action
program in the private sector absent some showing of prior discrimination. 86 However, when a member of a minority is the victim of employment 87 or industry-wide discrimination, 8 a
compelling governmental interest exists which justifies classifying the minority member in order to remedy the prior discrimination. 89 Thus, programs designed to eliminate discrimination
which classify individuals by race are not only necessary but judicially approved.9 0 The Supreme Court held that "just as...
race... must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in
formulating a remedy."9 1
ble, however, that no non-discriminating employee was deprived of the seniority status he had attained despite the fact that such status might have

been due to the illegal discrimination against blacks initially.
85. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 52-84 and accompanying text supra.
87. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).

88. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Schultz, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
89. For cases in the area of school desegregation, see, e.g., notes 20 and
23 supra; in the employment sector, see, e.g., United States v. Wood, Wire,
and Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973) (union ordered to

grant membership to minority applicants); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725
(1st Cir. 1972) (city ordered to give priority to black and Spanish-speaking
police applicants); Cartier v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (employer ordered to hire one minority employee
for every two non-minority workers until a certain number was reached);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (union ordered to hire a certain number of minority apprentices); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969) (union ordered to begin a minority recruiting program);
Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (employer
ordered to hire minority employees until they reached 30 percent of the

workforce).
90. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Alexander v.

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See
generally Note, Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co: Expanding The
Remedy For Employment Discrimination,1976 DEr. C.L. RE V. 609.
91. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
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Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test
The Court, however, continues to examine affirmative action
remedies to determine whether the strict scrutiny test is met.
This was true in Bakke and Weber. Since the minority business
set-aside classifies persons according to their race, it must also
withstand judicial review. The first prong of the strict scrutiny
test, that the program be based on racial classifications related
to a compelling governmental interest, is met. Congress perceived a pressing need to achieve equality of economic opportunity in the construction industry. However, the second prong of
the test, requiring the set-aside to be the least restrictive means
available, is not met. Existing acts can be used to increase the
participation of MBE's in government contracts. 92 Adding more
legislation merely increases the burden on contractors by requiring them to adhere to another set of regulations. Furthermore, a less restrictive program would permit the ten percent
set-aside to be available to all businesses which have suffered
94
low levels of unemployment or income, 93 not just a select few.
Moreover, by implementing a racially neutral program, the government is not involved in racial classifications.
Application of the Intermediate Test
If the minority business set-aside does not fulfill the strict
scrutiny test, the question becomes whether it meets Justice
Brennan's less restrictive intermediate test. Under this test, if
the means employed to assist a minority stigmatizes or singles
out powerless persons to bear the burden of the program, it will
be struck down.95 Applying this test to the minority business
set-aside, one can argue that it is inappropriate for the Court to
assume that because a contractor is a member of a nonminority
he is well-represented. 9 6 Therefore, the set-aside appears to fail
the intermediate test.
In deciding Fullilove, however, the Supreme Court used
neither the strict scrutiny test nor the intermediate test. As the
92. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2807 n.10 (1980) (Stevens,

J., dissenting); cf. Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1976) (program

designed to aid small businesses).
93. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2810 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Comment, The Minority Business Enterprise Set Aside: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1223, 1233 n.61 (1979).

94. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 468 U.S. 265 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also text accompanying
notes 53-71 supra.
95. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 468 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978).
96. See generally Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L REV. 775, 801-02 (1979).
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Court stated, "this opinion does not adopt, either expressly or
implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as
University of CaliforniaRegents v. Bakke. . .. ,,97 Alternatively,
the Court held that Congress has the "necessary latitude to try
new techniques such as the limited use of racial and ethnic cri'98
teria to accomplish remedial objectives.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the set-aside, first called
for the use of close examination 99 when reviewing programs that
employ racial criteria. It then stated, "we are bound to approach
our task with appropriate deference to the Congress. . .. "100
This deference is shown by accepting the articulated legislative
objective of the set-aside 1° ' without subjecting the measure to
strict scrutiny. The rationale is two-fold. First, the Court saw
the set-aside as merely a temporary measure. 10 2 Second, it
maintained that the non-minority petitioners indirectly benefitted from prior discrimination. This occurs when the non-MBE's
obtain jobs that would have been acquired by minority subcontractors but for the existence of discrimination. 10 3 Therefore,
the Court felt it was not unjust to deprive the non-MBE's of
some of their benefits. 1° 4 However, even if the minority business set-aside is as innocuous as the Court describes, the failure
to use any previously recognized standard of review portends a
complete abandonment of standards where Congress is involved.
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

An argument can be made, however, that there is no "abandonment of standards" because an analysis of Fullilove in relation to Bakke and Weber is not completely accurate. Fullilove
deals with an act of Congress while Bakke and Weber are disFullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2781(1980).
Id.
Id. at 2771.
Id.
Id. at 2780-81.
102. "This is a pernicious illusion. In human affairs nothing is so likely to

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

become permanent as the temporary. Once we strive to undo the consequences of past privileges by instating new privileges in the present, we

establish the precedent for the continuation of privilege in the future."

Hook, Preface to B. GRoss, DIScRIMINATION IN REVERSE Is TuiRNABoUT FAIR
PLAY at ix (1978).

103. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2778 (1980).
104. This premise would follow only if another premise were inserted
to the effect that all present injustices upon which we focus should be
remedied no matter what the consequences.... (Ilf the consequences of remedying this injustice were to create yet a greater injus-

tice, one would be loathe to think there was a moral ground for so doing.
B. GRoss, DISCRIMINATION IN REVERSE Is TuRNABouT FAiR PLAY 43 (1978).
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crimination cases pertaining to privately developed affirmative
action programs. Furthermore, Bakke involves an interpretation of section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964105
while Weber involves an interpretation of sections 703(a), (d),
and (j) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.106 Therefore, it
is more appropriate to test the Fullilove decision against previous Congressional legislation such as the Civil Rights Act 10 7 and
the Voting Rights Act. 10 8
The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act states that "no person in the United
States shall, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."' 1 9 Originally, the Act was
designed to preclude recipients of federal funds from discriminating against blacks." 0 Later, the concept developed that civil
rights legislation could countenance preferential treatment of
minorities to redress prior discrimination."' Congress was particularly concerned with the plight of blacks because they were
2
not receiving equal treatment in federally funded programs."
There were indications, however, that the framers of the Act expected the legislation to apply to all people. 113 In the words of
105.
106.
107.
108.

42
42
42
42

U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).

109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). However, § 2000e-2j provides that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee subject to this subchapter to grantpreferential
treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account
of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons or any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by
any employment agency of labor organization, admitted to membership
or classified by any labor organization, or'admitted to, or employed in,
any apprenticeship or other training program, incomparison with the
total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the available work force in any community, State section or other area
(emphasis added).
110. 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964).
111. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see
text accompanying notes 73-85 supra.
112. 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964).
113. "Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court reiter-
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Senator Humphrey, the Civil Rights Act is designed "to insure
that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation,"" 4 not merely for blacks.
The Civil Rights Act bans discrimination against all people."15 "[Djistinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry [are by their very nature] odious to a free people
whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. 11 6 While the original Civil Rights Act prohibited racial discrimination in federally funded programs," 7 Congress felt the
need to extend this prohibition to the employment sector. Consequently, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was enacted."l 8 Title
VII provides that a business receiving federal funds must institute affirmative action programs" 19 if it has discriminated
against minorities. 120 Failure to do so results in the loss of feddesigned to insure that past
eral monies. These programs are
2
racial favoritism is eliminated.' '
The concept of equality is embodied in section 703(j) of Title
VII. This section states that an employer is not required "to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race ... of such individual or groups"'1 22 in order
to correct a racial imbalance in the employer's shop. Specifi-

cally, Title VII outlaws discrimination against all individuals; it
does not allow Congress to discriminate against some individuated this viewpoint in 1976 when it held: "We ...hold today that Title VII
prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case
upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes. .. "
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (emphasis
added). But see United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979), and text accompanying notes 73-85 supra.
114. 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 778 (1976) (Court ordered retroactive seniority rights for minorities).
See generally United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969) (union ordered to publicize the termination of its past discriminatory practices).
116. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), quoting Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
117. See text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
119. See note 7 supra.
120. The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339, 340-41 (1964-65), as amended Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684, 685-86 (1966-67), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976) (emphasis added).
121. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979),
and text accompanying notes 73-85 supra.
122. See note 109 supra.
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als in order to give preferential treatment to others. In contrast,
the minority business set-aside program excludes non-MBE's
123
from sharing in ten percent of all federal funds.
While employers are not required to grant preferential
treatment, recipients of federal funds are compelled to remedy
their prior discriminatory practices. The penalty for not doing
so is the loss of federal funds. 124 Even when previous discrimination is lacking, an applicant for federal money can give special
consideration to race, color or national origin if minority participation in an industry is low. 1 25 The use of race, however, is only

one factor which is used to determine the recipients of federal
funds. It does not entitle minority groups to use race as the exclusive factor in granting federal monies. However, when the
Supreme Court upheld the minority business set-aside provision in Fullilove, it sanctioned a remedial program that employed race as the sole factor in deciding what groups share in
ten percent of federal funds.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965
A comparison of Fullilove to the Voting Rights Act of 1965126
is another example of Congress's departure from prior legislation. This Act is designed to guarantee access to the electoral
process for all people. 127 Before passage of the measure, Congress explored in great depth the problem of racial discrimination in voting. 128 "By outlawing specific practices, such as poll
taxes and special tests, the statute removed old barriers to equal
access; by requiring preclearance of changes in voting practices
123. See note 45 supra.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).

125. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
(institution of a special training program with admission preference for minorities); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (rhedicai
school set aside 16 seats specifically for minority applicants).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (1976) declares that:
No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the
sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited
by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant classroom language
was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote ...because of
his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the
English language ....
127. Id.
128. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1966).
The House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary each held hearings
for nine days and received testimony from a total of 67 witnesses. More
than three full days were consumed discussing the bill on the floor of
the House, while the debate in the Senate covered 26 days in all.
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in covered States, it precluded the erection of new barriers."'129
Furthermore, there was no Congressional finding that this legisltion would have a deleterious effect upon the nonminority
130
members.
The Fullilove Analysis-Inconsistent With the High Court's
Interpretationof Other Civil Rights Legislation
Two factors immediately distinguish the minority set-aside
provision from earlier civil rights legislation. First, both the
Civil Rights Act of 1964131 and the Voting Rights Act of 196532
were preceded by exhaustive Congressional debate before passage. Second, Congress made specific findings of prior discrimination before it developed remedial programs to redress the
133
situation.
Unlike the detailed legislative debates which led to the enactment of the Local Public Works Act 3 4 and the Public Works
Employment Act, 135 the legislative history of the ten percent minority set-aside provision was noticeably lacking. Congress
never considered the plight of the MBE's until the House was
prepared to vote on the Public Works Employment Act. 136 At
that point Congressman Mitchell argued that minorities would
not have a fair opportunity to share in the benefits of the public
works program.' 37 No congressional study was conducted, however, concerning the specific problems of MBE's. 1 38 Furthermore, the MBE amendment, proposed by Congressman
Mitchell, was never considered by the House or Senate Judiciary Committees. 139 This situation renders the scant legislative
history of the set-aside a tool of limited utility in interpreting the
legislative purpose of the statute. 14°
129. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2810 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. "Section 4(e) does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect
extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it by state
law." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966). See also United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (affirmative action redistricting
program upheld).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976).
133. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2810 (1980) (Stevens, J., dis-

senting).
134. See note 40 supra.

135. See note 39 supra.
136. 123 CONG. REC. 5097-98 (1977).
137. Id. at 5098, 5327.
138. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2775 (1980).
139. Id. at 2764.
140. Congress assumed, and the Court accepted, the view that because
minority businesses received only a small percentage of government con-
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After minimal congressional debate on the MBE amendment, an addendum granted the Secretary of Commerce the
power to grant waivers in certain circumstances.14 ' Although
the set-aside remained intact, the Secretary had the power to
waive the ten percent requirement where its application was not
feasible. This would occur, for example, when MBE's were nonexistent in an area targeted for federal funds. Following this
change, the Public Works Employment Act, the original of
which contained no set-aside provision, passed the House. 14
The Senate amended its draft and adopted the House MBE
amendment without debate. 143 The bill was eventually enacted
by Congress.'"
Despite the lack of specific findings of discrimination, the
minority business set-aside singles out certain groups to receive
preferential treatment. 45 The result of the race-based condition
on the construction industry is two-fold. First, general contractors cannot award a subcontract to the lowest bidder unless it is
an MBE. The set-aside requires that contracts be awarded to
MBE's if their higher bids reflect inflated prices caused by discrimination. 146 Second, since contractors are required to subcontract to MBE's, some non-MBE's are automatically
precluded from an award of a contract because of their race.
The effect of the minority set-aside provision forces contractors to choose subcontractors and suppliers for reasons totally
unrelated to the construction industry. In the past, these
choices were ordinarily based upon experience, reputation, and
tracts, they must be subject to discrimination by the construction industry
at large. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2767 (1980). However, the
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIViL RIGT-rrs, "Minorities
and Women as Government Contractors" 24 (May, 1975) did not cite discrimination as the reason for the relatively small number of MBE's acquiring government contracts.
What it did find was ten specific problems causing economic hardship
to minority businesses: (1) insufficient working capital; (2) no knowledge
of future bidding opportunities; (3) inadequate marketing staff; (4) overbidding; (5) inadequate past experience; (6) poor understanding of bidding
procedures; (7) little understanding of government contracting regulations;
(8) poor preparation of bids and proposals; (9) inadequate staff; and (10)
unfamiliarity with preselection prior to the formal advertising process. See
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 19-20, Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d
Cir. 1978).
141. 123 CONG. REC. 5328 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Roe).
142. 123 CONG. REC. 5352 (1977).
143. 123 CONG. REC. 7173 (1977).
144. 123 CONG. REC. 12943 (1977); 123 CONG. REC. 13257 (1977).

145. See note 45 supra.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(e) (1) (1977) ("Construction of each such project
shall be performed by contract awarded by competitive bidding, unless the
Secretary shall affirmatively find that, under the circumstances relating to
such project, some other method is in the public interest.").
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ability. Today, contractors are required to select businesses
solely on the basis of their race.
The Court in Fullilove accepted as fact, without corroborating evidence, that industry-wide discrimination existed in the
construction field. Therefore, even if petitioners were not themselves guilty of discriminatory practices, the Court held they
had received a benefit since MBE's were excluded from contracting opportunities. 14 7 Although innocent of any illegal conduct, petitioners were required to shoulder the burden of
remedying prior discrimination; they were excluded from ten
percent of federal public work funds. 148 This approach deviated
from the Court's previous civil rights decisions. In the past, detailed legislative findings of specific discrimination 149 were required before the Court would approve "a classification that
[aided] persons as members of relatively victimized groups at
the expense of other innocent individuals .... ,15o Moreover, as
Chief Justice Burger once queried, "how [were] judges supposed to ascertain the purpose of a statute except through the
words Congress used and the legislative history of the statute's
evolution?"' 15 1 While the purpose of the minority business setaside was.to redress prior discrimination suffered by MBE's,
Congress failed to make specific findings of discrimination
152
against the MBE's benefitted.
THE COURT'S ROLE AS FINAL ARBITER

As indicated by the previous discussion, the Court in Fullilove neither required a detailed legislative history of prior discrimination nor applied any standard previously employed to
test the constitutionality of the set-aside. Therefore, a question
arises as to why the Court chose not to strictly evaluate Congress's legislation. One suggestion is based upon the "func147. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2778 (1980).
148. Id.
149. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.

150. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978).
151. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 217 (1979)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
152. See Montana Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 460 F.
Supp. 1174 (D. Mont. 1978) (no findings that mixed blood Indians had been
discriminated against); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 459 F. Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (court did not find the provision an
acceptable way to increase minority business participation in the construction industry); cf.Wright Farms Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D.
Vt. 1977) (court rejected the minority business provision because it could
find no history of discrimination in the state).
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tional differentiation"'15 3 between Congress and the Supreme
Court. The functional differentiation is based upon the assumption that the work of the judiciary differs dramatically from that
of the legislature. If the courts addressed themselves to the
same issues as the legislature there would be an invasion of the
legislative function. 5 4 The Fullilove Court followed this theory,
particularly when it emphasized "necessary latitude"'15 5 in its
relations with Congress.
The Court, however, could have adopted the theory of
"checks and balances' 156 which "really requires that the court
reconsider the same questions that the legislature has already
considered."'1 7 Whenever Congress embarks on a new course
of action the Court is entitled to scrutinize the legislation to protect the American citizen from a violation of his civil rights. In
the case of the minority business set-aside a preference is created for only a few specified minority groups.
In both its substantive and procedural aspects this Act is markedly
different from the normal product of the legislative decisionmaking
process. The very fact that Congress for the first time in the Nation's history has created a broad legislative classification for entitlement to benefits based solely on racial characteristics identifies a
between this Act and the thousands of statutes
dramatic difference
158
that preceded it.

Since the set-aside departs from previous affirmative action programs, the Court should have examined more carefully the constitutionality of the legislation. 159 Too great a deference to
Congress weakens the position of the Supreme Court as final
arbiter of constitutional questions.
THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINING A MINOR=Y AND AFFIXING
RAcIAL LABELS

Defining a Minority
The Court, by upholding the set-aside, forces governmental
involvement in racial labeling. The set-aside provision specifies
that Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos,
153. Tussman &tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof The Laws, 37 CAIn. L.
REV. 341, 365-66 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman &tenBroek].
154. Id.
155. See note 97 and text accompanying note 98 supra.
156. Tussman &tenBroek, supra note 153, at 366.
157. Id.
158. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2811-12 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. "[Tlhe Court .. .must stand guard against an over-concern for
mere 'convenience'; and,. . . must place a barrier in the path of over-eager
acquiescence." Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 153, at 351
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and Aleuts qualify as minority groups for the purpose of the
Public Works Employment Act. 160 This list, however, does not
describe how to verify the minority status of a particular applicant. In particular, how much minority blood must one have to
qualify under the set-aside provision? This question must be
answered, as a benefit attaches to a person in a MBE. An incentive, therefore, exists to misrepresent one's racial heritage in or16 1
der to share in this benefit.
Racial classifications do not have well-defined limits. At one
time in United States history, a person was designated legally
black if he was one-eighth Negro. 162 Today, in some Indian
tribes, a person qualifies as an Indian with only one-eighth Indian blood.163 A different standard exists under the guidelines
of the Economic Development Administration. According to
that organization, a minority member is a person with any
amount of minority blood, regardless of the percentage. 164 As a
result of the minority business set-aside, the government and
the courts are dragged into the business of racial labeling in order to prevent unjust claims for federal funds.
Assuming it is desirable for the government and the courts
to become involved in racial labeling, correct racial classifications are not always self-evident. For example, some blacks and
Spanish-speaking people have Caucasion features and are indistinguishable from Caucasians. 65 Thus, "the question arises
whether it [classification] is to be applied on the basis of the
physical appearance of the individual or on the basis of a geneological research as to his [applicant's] ancestry."'16 6 If neither is
conclusive, the government can always adopt the anthropological approach and make "distinctions of race on differences in the
size and the proportions of skulls and on other physical differ160. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1977).
161. In San Francisco, for example, fifty-three self-proclaimed American
Indian police officers were reclassified as white by the Equal Opportunity

Commission. J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN To BAKE THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGREGATION: 1954-1978, at 292 (1979).

162. "The power to assign to a particular [railroad] coach obviously implies the power to determine . . . who, under the laws of the particular
State, is to be deemed a white, and who a colored person." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896); see also Posner, The Defunis Case And The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT.
REV. 1, 12-14 [hereinafter cited as Posner].

163. Montana Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 460 F. Supp.
1174, 1178 (D. Mont. 1978) (Walter Fouty, one-eighth Confederated Salish
and Kootenai; William L. Kelly, one-fourth Crow; Ronald Paul, 15/32 Blackfeet; Raymond Wetzel, one-fourth Cree-Chippewa).
164. U.S. DEPT. OF CoMM., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, MINORITY ENTERPRISE TECHNICAL BULLETIN (1977).

165. Posner, supra note 162, at 12.
166. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 730, 198 P.2d 17, 28 (1948).
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ences found to follow these, such as the shape of the cross sec167
tion of the hair and the composition of the blood.'
If the above scenario appears absurd, consider defining any
of the enumerated minorities in the set-aside provision. For example, neither physical appearance nor geneology help in the
classification of the American Indian because the definition of
an Indian is imprecise. 168 Not only must the individual have ancestors who lived in America before it was discovered by
Europeans, he must also be "recognized as an Indian by either a
tribe, tribal organization, or a suitable authority in the commu69
nity."1
Furthermore, despite Congress's all-encompassing "Indian"
classification, there is no single group known as the American
Indian. The Bibliography of American Ethnology 70 lists a minimum of sixty-seven Indian tribes ranging from the Acoma to the
Zuni. Each Indian tribe has its own culture, language, customs,
personalities, and beliefs. 17 1 While it is true that many American Indians have been subjected to mistreatment, 172 the minority business set-aside lumps together all Indians for special
treatment despite their individual characteristics and needs.
The Set-Aside Provision-Underinclusiveand Overinclusive
A dual problem is created by massing people together who
are really separate and distinct; the group becomes either underinclusive or overinclusive. For example, the set-aside is
designed to aid only those MBE's that are victims of prior discrimination.'73 The set-aside, therefore, is underinclusive as it
limits its benefits to only some minorities rather than all businesses which have experienced discrimination. 7 4 The United
States is comprised of citizens from at least thirty-eight separate
minority groups-fom Arab-Americans to Yugoslav-Americans.175 It is certainly conceivable that some of these groups
167. THE LINcoLN LIBRARY OF ESSENTIAL INFORMATION 514 (1951).

168. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976).

169. Montana Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 460 F. Supp.
1174, 1176 (D. Mont. 1978) ("A suitable authority in the community may be:
educational institutions, religious organizations, or state agencies.").
170. M. CASHMAN & B. KLEIN, THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN ETHNOLOGY (1976).

171. W.E. WASHBURN, THE INDIAN IN AMERICA at XV (1975).
172. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 (1974).
173. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2771 (1980).
174. It is conceivable that a non-MBE from Appalachia might experience
greater economic difficulties than an MBE in an urban area. Posner, supra

note 162, at 14.
175. See note 170 supra.
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have suffered discrimination sufficient to warrant redress by the
government.
Moreover, it is also arguable that the designated beneficiaries of the set-aside program represent an overinclusive
group. The set-aside provision treats in a similar manner those
whom Congress intended to aid but also those who share their
distinguishing characteristics. This latter group, however, may
not share a personal history of prior discrimination. 176 While it
is perhaps true that "Spanish-speaking" and "Oriental" contractors who have lived in the United States for many years have
experienced discrimination, many applicants will be children of
recent immigrants or immigrants themselves. 177 Their disadvantageous position in the construction industry might be attributed to their own economic and social conditions in their
homeland, and the consequence of beginning a new life in a foreign country. 178 Additionally, if the preference for "Spanishspeaking" includes MBE's other than Mexican-Americans and
Puerto Ricans, it will "encompass many persons who may not
have suffered the effects of significant discrimination in the
United States."'1 79 In particular, the recent Cuban refugees are
Spanish-speaking, but have not been in the United States long
enough to have suffered discrimination in the construction industry.

A further example of the overinclusiveness of the set-aside
provision is the "Oriental" class. Similar to the situation of the
American Indian, the continent of Asia is comprised of many diverse groups with separate identities and cultures. It is doubtful
that they have all suffered significant continuous discrimina-

tion.' 8 0 In fact, some sub-groups of Orientals are well-represented in the construction industry and are8 not impeded in their

opportunity to share in federal contracts.' '

The FraudulentMinority
Still other pitfalls exist with the set-aside. Certain persons
may fraudulently misrepresent themselves as members of a
chosen minority merely to share in the set-aside. The Report of
176. Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 120.
177. The "Spanish-speaking" class could conceivably include the recent
Cuban refugees and the "Oriental" class might include the Vietnamese refugees. Although they fall into the preferred minority category, they have
not suffered prior discrimination in this country to warrant their sharing in
the federal public works fund.
178. Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 118.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 120.
181. Id.
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The Comptroller General of the United States 182 raises certain
questions with respect to the identification of bona fide MBE's.
First, it states that some enterprises are established solely to
take advantage of the "free" funds and have no intention of
remaining in the construction field beyond the termination of
the program. 183 Second, certain supposed minority owners are
merely figureheads for nonminority owners. 184 Third, minority
subcontractors subcontract out most of their work to nonminority businesses. 185 Therefore, the problems facing an administrative agency created to oversee the set-aside program can be
summarized as follows: (1) the agency must determine what
constitutes membership in a particular racial group; (2) it must
develop adequate means to establish that an applicant is a member of a minority group; 86 and (3) it must determine whether a
particular applicant for federal local public works funds has suffered prior discrimination.
The List of Minorities in the Set-Aside-A Product of
Congressional Caprice?
The above definitional difficulties of minorities represent
the practical problem inherent in the set-aside. 18 7 However, another problem not addressed by Congress in creating the select
minority group is that America is a country of minorities. There
is no accurate basis for deciding which groups should be singled
out for special help and which should not. 188 "It would hardly
[deservto find ...
take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer189
ing] minorities at every turn in the road."'
Furthermore, a serious consequence of racial classification
182.

REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Jan.

16, 1979.
183. Id. at iii.
184. Id. at 25-27.
185. Id. at 27.
186. See generally B.

BrrrKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS

(1973)

(discussion of the problems associated with racial classifications).
187. See text accompanying notes 162-71 supra.
188. Mr. Justice Douglas noted the problems associated with such in-

quiries:
The reservation of a proportion of the law school class for members
of selected minority groups is fraught with ... dangers, for one must
immediately determine which groups are to receive such favored treat-

ment and which are to be excluded, the proportions of the class that are

to be allocated to each, and even the criteria by which to determine
whether an individual is a member of a favored group. There is no assurance that a common agreement can be reached, and first the schools,
and then the courts, will be buffeted with the competing claims.

DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 338 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
189. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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is the resentment and hostility engendered in nonminorities' 9°
when minorities are singled out to receive special benefits. Despite the classification of the set-aside as a temporary measure,
"inclusion in employment goals and quotas is clearly a positive
benefit for individuals in the benefitted groups, and an actual
loss for the others. As a result these benefits will be defended

most fiercely."1 9 1 As a consequence of racial labeling, American
citizens are increasingly divided into categories with different
rights.

192

The Rebirth of Racial Classifications
Racial classifications pose a new dilemma for the country.
The concept of equal protection for all is blurred when one
group is singled out to receive a benefit denied to another group.
Under the fourteenth amendment, no person is to be denied
equal protection of the law by any state. 193 Although there is no
equal protection clause applicable to the federal government,
the due process clause of the fifth amendment prevents the federal government from treating people unequally. 194 This requirement that all people be treated equally, however, does not
mean that all legislation which discriminates against a group is
unconstitutional since nearly all legislation treats orie segment
of society differently than another.1 95 Nor does equal protection
preclude preferential programs merely because they are based
190. "It focuses on race in such a way that it draws attention to racial
differences, and, though not intending to do so, exacerbates them in some
minds." COUNTING By RACE, supra note 82, at 156.
191. N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMNATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 201 (1975); see note 102 supra.
192. It is common to refer to "the rights of minorities" or "minority
rights", but both phrases are misleading in suggesting that the rights
referred to are uniquely those of minorities by conferring rights upon
them alone. Its premise, rather, is that certain interests of individuals
are to be immunized from governmental authority without regard to
whether the individuals are members of the majority or of a minority.
Sandalow, JudicialProtection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1164-65

n.6 (1977).
193. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
194. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (distinction
by sex for different social security benefits is unconstitutional); Boiling v.

Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (segregation of Negro children in the public
schools denies them due process).
195. See Tussman &tenBroek, supra note 153, at 344 ("The Constitution
does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as though
they were the same."); see also Trimble v. Gorden, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The Equal Protection Clause is itself a classic
paradox .... It creates a requirement of equal treatment to be applied to
the process of legislation-legislation whose very purpose is to draw lines
in such a way that different people are treated differently.").
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on racial classifications. 196 However, what the equal protection

clause does prevent is the use of racial classification from continuing unchecked. "[TIhe equal protection clause reminds the
legislator that he must guard himself against favoritism or inequality of purpose.' 97 Therefore, if a program, such as the Public Works Employment Act,' 98 guarantees to MBE's the same
opportunity to share in all federal funds as non-MBE's, the program offends no one. However, the designated minorities in the
set-aside provision reap benefits at the expense of non-MBE's
by having 400 million dollars set-aside strictly for their own use.
The question becomes, which represents the American goal:
equality for all or inequality for some to redress prior discrimination?
Legitimization of Racial Classifications

For a time, the answer to the question was equality for all.
Between the years 1955 and 1976, the Supreme Court held that
justice in civil rights cases required an end to benefits and burdens based solely on racial classifications. 99 Today, however,
under the Fullilove decision, the Supreme Court holds that justice requires the imposition of burdens upon non-MBE's to help
MBE's receive a larger share of federal funds. 20 0 Unfortunately,
"once the use of race becomes legitimate again, we shall repeat
all of the problems that divided us before: solidarity collapses,
consensus with respect to the impropriety of measuring by race
dissolves, race becomes important once more, and all are diminished by the experience."'20 1 This foreshadows numerous potential difficulties.
One result of legitimizing racial classifications is the danger
of other ethnic groups engaging in an endless struggle for political preference. 20 2 Another drawback of race-based preferential
programs is their tendency to reinforce the stereotype that certain groups are unable to attain success without special protection.20 3 Moreover, benefits based upon racial classifications are
196: See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.

Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning ordinance classified people by race).
197. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 153, at 365.

198. See note 39 supra.
199. Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 783-84 (1979).
200. Fulilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2778 (1980).
201. Alstyne, Rites of Passage.- Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI.L. REV. 775, 778 n.10 (1979).
202. J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN To BAKKE THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGREGATION: 1954-1978, at 293 (1979).
203. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-

ing) (a separate program for minorities "creates suggestions of stigma and

19811
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simply morally wrong. "Indeed, that is the great lesson for government itself to teach: in all we do in life, whatever we do in
life, to treat any person less well than another or to favor anyone
more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is
wrong. Let that be our fundamental law. ....-204
Finally, on a more practical level, the purpose of the racebased minority business set-aside is to enable MBE's to compete in the construction industry.20 5 However, the net effect of
having a set-aside exclusively for the use of minority contractors
is to remove them from industry-wide competition. The result is
just another "support survival program" 20 6 which Congress
sought to avoid 20 7 due to the drain on federal funds.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision to uphold the minority business set-aside creates many difficulties. First, it represents a
relegitimization of benefits awarded solely on the basis of
race. 20 8 Second, it raises the problem of how to define a minority.20 9 Third, it creates a moral dilemma. The country is told
that it is acceptable to discriminate against nonminorities provided it is to help minorities. Yet, if discrimination is wrong, it is
wrong at all times and for all people. The Supreme Court, however, has allowed Congress to discriminate against non-MBE's
by excluding them from ten percent of federal local public works
funds. This is due to an assumed pressing need to eliminate racial imbalance in the construction industry. 210 Certainly, the de21 1
sire to eliminate racial imbalance is an honorable goal.
However, "there is perhaps no device more destructive to the
caste ...."); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298
(1978) (Powell, J.) ("[P] referential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success with-

out special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual
worth.").

204. Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Consti-

tution, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 775, 809-10 (1979).
205. 123 CONG. REC. 5327 (1977) (remarks
206. Id.
207. Id.

of Rep. Mitchell).

208. See note 45 supra.

209. See text accompanying notes 162-71 supra.
210. A court should accept the articulated purpose of the legislation but
closely scrutinize the relationship between the classification and the purpose. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2781 (1980); see Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).

211. However, "there is always the danger that the seeds of precedent
sown by good men for the best of motives will yield a rich harvest of unprincipled acts of others also aiming at 'good ends.'" United Steelworkers of

America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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notion of equality than the numerus clausus-the quota. The rasword that must
cial quota is ... a creator of castes, a two-edged
2 12
demean one in order to prefer another."
Furthermore, such legislation directly violates the concept
of equal protection. 213 "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are
not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal. ' 214 Since
the Supreme Court finds that the Constitution prohibits the exclusion of minorities from sharing in federal funds, it ought to
provide the same protection for nonminorities.
A better focus for the country is a program to aid all disadvantaged contractors, not just those in a small select group. A
desirable end2 15 does not justify a return to the awarding of benefits based solely upon racial classifications. 2 16 "It is one thing
for groups to nurture their own ethnic and racial identity, quite
another for government to allocate upon it."

2 17

Margery Sabian

212. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 73-85 supra.
213. "The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial
barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society
ought to be organized." DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
214. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
215. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758 (1980), it is an increase in
minority business participation in the construction industry.
216. In the longer run, the Court is taking frightful risks. (1) Can the
Court insist on such intrusive use of racial classification without teaching the country that policies based on racial classification are legitimate? (2) Will those who are asked to step aside for the benefit of
blacks not harbor ill will against them? Will this not be a particular
problem for the young, who, having grown up on this side of the civil
rights revolution, disassociate themselves from the racism of the old

America, and may be surprised to learn that they are asked to pay for
it?
Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousnessto the Constitutio" Weber, Dayton and Columbus, 1979 Sup.CT. REV. 1, 12-13.

217. J. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE THE SUPREME COURT AND
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 293 (1979).

